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a b s t r a C t 
During recent years the topic of Gypsy/Roma migration and 
identities became a burning topic of pan-EUropean public dis-
course. Much less attention is paid to Gypsy migrations outside 
the borders of the European Union. The present article has an 
ambitious goal to fulfill this gap and present contemporary Gyp-
sy migrations in post-Soviet Central Asia, in order to see how 
this “burning” topic looks outside the European space. After 
a breakdown of Soviet Union and establishing new independ-
ent republics in Central Asia and in connection to economical 
difficulties, wars and social unrest, in order to make their liv-
ing, the communities of Central Asian ‘Gypsies’ revitalised their 
former nomadic traditions and migrated towards the Russian 
Federation and within Central Asia also towards Kazakhstan. 
There they are earning their living through begging and sporadic 
work in construction and scrap collection. 
A central point of this article is to demonstrate the impact of 
these contemporary migrations on the development of identi-
ties and well being of Central Asian ‘Gypsies’. The multilevel, 
hierarchically structured identities of Central-Asian ‘Gypsies’ 
are analysed as they appear in different historical contexts – 
as former “Soviet people,” member of former ruling class of 
agricultural proletariat, and as declassed community today; 
as Central-Asian ‘Gypsies’ or as citizens of respective Central 
Asian Republics during migrations in the Russian Federation 
vis a vis Russian majority society and vis a vis Roma; as well 
as in the context of the Central Asian region during the migra-
tions to Kazakhstan and in their home countries. 
K e y  w o r d s: Central Asia; Gypsies; Lyuli; Mug’at; Roma; 
migration; identities
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2CyganiE środkowoazjatyCCy – tożsaMośCi i MigraCjE
S t r e s z c z e n i e
W ostatnich latach tematyka migracji i tożsamości Cyganów (Romów) stała się tematem palącym 
w unijnoeuropejskim dyskursie publicznym. O wiele mniej uwagi poświęca się w nim migracjom 
Cyganów, które mają miejsce poza granicami Unii Europejskiej. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wy-
pełnienie tej luki i ukazanie współczesnych migracji Cyganów w posowieckiej Azji Środkowej, po to 
by móc spojrzeć, jak ów „palący” problem przedstawia się poza obszarem europejskim. Po rozpa-
dzie Związku Sowieckiego i ustanowieniu w Azji Środkowej nowych niepodległych republik, a także 
wobec trudności gospodarczych, wojen i niepokojów społecznych, w dążeniu do uzyskania środków 
do życia, wspólnoty „Cyganów” środkowoazjatyckich powróciły do swych dawnych tradycji noma-
dycznych i migrują na teren Federacji Rosyjskiej jak też w obrębie Azji Środowej do Kazachstanu. Za-
rabają tu na życie żebraniem, okazjonalnie podejmują pracę na budowach, zajmują się też zbieraniem 
surowców wtórnych. 
Zasadniczą kwestią rozpatrywaną w niniejszym artykule jest ukazanie, jak te współczesne mi-
gracje wpływają na budowanie tożsamości i dobrobytu środkowoazjatyckich „Cyganów”. Przed-
stawiona została analiza wielopoziomowych hierarchicznie ustrukturyzowanych tożsamości „Cyga-
nów” środkowoazjatyckich, przejawiających się w różnych kontekstach historycznych: jako „ludzi 
sowieckich”, członków dawnej klasy przewodniej – wiejskiego proletariatu, i jako zdeklasowanej dziś 
wspólnoty; jako „Cyganie” środkowoazjatyccy lub jako obywatele odnośnych republik środkowoazja-
tyckich podczas migracji na terenie Federacji Rosyjskiej vis a vis dominującej wspólnoty społeczeń-
stwa rosyjskiego, jak też vis a vis Romów; a także w kontekście regionu środkowoazjatyckiego pod-
czas migracji do Kazachstanu oraz w ich krajach ojczystych.
S ł o w a  k l u c z o w e: Cyganie; Azja Środkowa; Luli; Mugaci; Romowie; migracje; tożsamość
Throughout Central Asia, in the newly independent states (former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) live distinctive ethnic communities collectively referred to as ‘Central-Asian Gypsies’ in English and 
tsygane sredneaziatskie in Russian, the latter term was used in the Russian Empire and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ussr) and is in use also nowadays in the Russian 
Federation. This appellation connects the Central Asian Gypsies with communities that 
were called ‘Gypsies’ in the past. In the last circa 20 years the designation ‘Gypsies’ is 
declared pejorative and politically correct term is considered to be ‘Roma’ which is the 
self-appellation of a significant part of communities living in Europe. Today we see a me-
chanical replacement of the previously used designations with the term ‘Roma’ and the 
issue of appropriateness or inappropriateness of the politically correct terminology is not 
on the agenda. Instead of this, on the level of policies we are observing hectic attempts 
to bring together the different types of communities generally labeled as ‘Gypsies’ in the 
past under one umbrella term, and in this way to justify the common policy aims towards 
them and predetermine common outcomes. There have been numerous attempts, ho-
wever, by policy makers in the European Union and the Council of Europe level to solve 
the terminological issue and to find appropriate terminology and an umbrella definition. It 
is enough to quote the latest (for the time being!) “official” definitions in order to obtain 
an idea about the lack of relevance to the objectively existing realities and accordingly to 
the scientific knowledge about these realities. 
3The declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the rise of anti-gypsyism and ra-
cist violence against roma in Europe, adopted on 1 February 2012, states: 
The term “Roma” used at the Council of Europe refers to Roma, Sinti, Kale and related 
groups in Europe, including Travellers and the Eastern groups (Dom and Lom), and covers the 
wide diversity of the groups concerned, including persons who identify themselves as ‘Gyp-
sies’. (Declaration, 2012) 
This definition is misleading, because on the one hand it put under the cover term 
‘Roma’ not only European ‘Gypsies’, but even more communities such as dom and lom 
who live outside Europe, while in the same time it directly excludes large groups of peo-
ple who do not identify themselves as ‘Gypsies’, but surrounding their population consi-
ders them (and refers to them) as to such. 
Not better, neither more precise is the definition in the European Framework of natio-
nal roma inclusion strategies adopted in 2011: 
The term “Roma” is used – similarly to other political documents of the European Parliament 
and the European Council – as an umbrella which includes groups of people who have more 
or less similar cultural characteristics, such as Sinti, Travellers, Kalé, Gens du voyage, etc. 
whether sedentary or not (European Commission, 2011) 
This definition is misleading too because Roma who live in Central, Eastern and Sou-
theastern Europe share “more or less similar cultural characteristics” with the surroun-
ding majority population much more than with other groups such as sinti, kalé, travel-
lers, gens du voyage, etc. 
In 2012 the European Commission starts the process of implementation of the Euro-
pean Framework of national roma inclusion strategies and provides a new definition: 
The term “Roma” is used here, as well as by a number of international organisations and 
representatives of Roma groups in Europe, to refer to a number of different groups (such as 
Roma, Sinti, Kale, Gypsies, Romanichels, Boyash, Ashkali, Egyptians, Yenish, Dom, Lom) and 
also includes Travellers, without denying the specificities and varieties of lifestyles and situa-
tions of these groups (European Commission, 2012) 
This definition includes even more communities and similarly to the declaration of the 
Committee of Ministers on the rise of anti-gypsyism and racist violence against roma 
in Europe encompasses also dom and lom who live outside Europe. It brings no more 
accuracy in the issue, on the contrary, it only further complicates it. 
The recently adopted CAHROM (Ad hoc Committee of experts on Roma issues) defi-
nition states: 
The terms “Roma and Travellers” are being used at the Council of Europe to encompass the 
wide diversity of the groups covered by the work of the Council of Europe in this field: on the 
one hand 
a) Roma, Sinti/Manush, Calé, Kaale, Romanichals, Boyash/Rudari;
b) Balkan Egyptians (Egyptians and Ashkali);
c) Eastern groups (Dom, Lom and Abdal); and, on the other hand, groups such as Travellers, 
Yenish, and the populations designated under the administrative term “Gens du voyage”, as 
well as persons who identify themselves as Gypsies (CAHROM, 2015).
As can be seen, the number of communities included in the term ‘Roma’ continues, 
here with added abdal from Asia Minor. 
In these definitions the Central Asian Gypsies are not mentioned explicitly but being 
designated as ‘Gypsies’ suppose they should be included too. This was done recently in 
the definition offered by the United Nations: 
4The term “Roma” refers to heterogeneous groups, the members of which live in various co-
untries under different social, economic, cultural and other conditions. The term “Roma” thus 
does not denote a specific group but rather refers to the multifaceted Roma universe, which 
is comprised of groups and subgroups that overlap but are united by common historical ro-
ots, linguistic communalities and a shared experience of discrimination in relation to majority 
groups. “Roma” is therefore a multidimensional term that corresponds to the multiple and 
fluid nature of Roma identity (Report, 2015: 2);
Roma groups are also present in Central Asian countries, where they are known collectively 
as lyuli. While those groups are distinct from American and European Roma, they share the 
experience of exclusion and marginalization from local majority populations (Report, 2015: 3). 
Adding the criteria “shared experience of exclusion and marginalization” opens new 
horizons for expanding the scope of the term ‘Roma’ and only the future will show how 
many communities will be covered with this umbrella term in future.
Domination of political discourse over the academic one nowadays is accepted as 
a norm by the modern academic community, so the term Roma gradually replaced the old 
designations of communities who previously, all together and equally incorrect, were labe-
led ‘Gypsies’. In the case of ‘Central Asian Gypsies’, uniting different communities, living 
in the new, independent states of Central Asia, which mostly have nothing in common 
both in their origin and in their language, under one umbrella term is absurd too, but even 
more absurd is to place them under the cover term ‘Roma’. The Central Asian Gypsies 
and the Roma (labeled usually the ‘European Gypsies’ by their surrounding populations) 
are perceived as different communities by themselves and by their surrounding population 
too. And something more, during our field researches in the region (2011-2013) we heard 
(and have seen) about different cases of mixed marriages among these two communities 
with representatives of their surrounding population, but have not found a single case (in 
the past, and nowadays) of a mixed marriage between ‘Central Asian Gypsies’ and Roma. 
Generally speaking, that what unites all the communities called ‘Central Asian Gyp-
sies’ into one category is their distinction (according to their lifestyle, main occupation, 
ethno-social structure, certain ethno-cultural characteristics, etc.) and their generally mar-
ginal social position throughout the whole Central Asia. However there are also other 
communities in similar position who are nevertheless not labeled ‘Gypsies’. In order to 
specify about whom is the present article in the first place we should answer the que-
stion “Who are the Central-Asian Gypsies?”.
MosaiC oF thE CoMMunitiEs in CEntral asia 
dEsignatEd as ‘CEntral-asian gyPsiEs’
Within the former USSR the current trend is to use lyuli as a blanket term for a num-
ber of groups known as Central-Asian Gypsies. They are also known as jughi in Tajiki-
stan, Multoni in some regions of Uzbekistan and sporadically also gurbath (or gurvath). 
They have been present in the land of a contemporary Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for centuries, since their ancestors migrated from India 
(Snesarev, 1960, pp. 24–29; Snesarev & Troitskaia, 1963, pp. 597–609; Nazarov, 1968b, 
pp. 43–45, 1968c, 53–55, 1975, pp. 3–23, 1980, pp. 165–185, 1982, pp. 3–28; Demeter, 
1980, pp. 143–149; Abashin, 2004; Bessonov, 2008, pp. 27–39; Gabbasov, 2008a; Gabba-
sov & Cherenkov, 2008; Khakimov, 2010, pp. 32–53; Marszewski, 2011). 
5They are not the only ‘Central Asian Gypsies’. There are other, relatively small, 
groups, mainly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, that can be identified as ‘intermediate 
communities’; they often differentiate themselves from lyuli (and lyuli likewise diffe-
rentiate themselves from them) though their surrounding populations perceive them 
all as a single minority of lyuli or Central Asian Gypsies. These are the tavoktarosh (or 
kosatarosh, or sogutarosh in Tajikistan), Mazang and agha (called also kashgar lyuli). 
The designation ‘Mazang’ (literally “dark, dark-faced”) often leads to confusion, as it 
can refer to “real” Mazang, i.e. those who use this term to describe themselves as 
well as to Mug’at, tavoktarosh, and other ‘lyuli-like communities’ (Oransky, 1971b, 
pp. 202–207). All these groups are relatively close to lyuli and perhaps in the past 
were even part of them (Snesarev, 1960, pp. 24–29; Snesarev & Troitskaia, 1963, 
pp. 597–609; Nazarov, 1968b, pp. 43–45, 1975, pp. 3–23, 1980, pp. 165–185, 1982, 
pp. 3–28; Demeter, 1980, pp. 143–149; Bessonov, 2008, pp. 27–39; Gabbasov, 2008b; 
Khakimov, 2010, pp. 32–53).
The region is also home to a number of other groups usually defined by scholars as 
‘Gypsy-like communities’ such as the Chistoni, kavol, baluj and Parya. Relative newco-
mers to the region (their ancestors migrated here from Afghanistan and India in 18th – 19th 
centuries), they are more obviously distinct from the lyuli. All of these groups maintain 
their differentiation (including the practice of endogamy) and may even strongly oppo-
se being classed under the lyuli heading (Oransky, 1961, pp. 62–77, 1964a, pp. 3–16, 
1964b, pp. 62–75, 1971a, pp. 66–99, 1977, 1983; Nazarov, 1968b, pp. 43–45, 1975, 
pp. 3–23, 1982, pp. 3–28; Demeter, 1980, pp. 143–149; Abashin, 2004; Bessonov, 2008, 
pp. 27–39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov, 2008; Khakimov, 2010, pp. 32–53).
The division of the so-called lyuli and other ‘Gypsy-like communities’ in Central Asia 
can be presented schematically as follows:
Central Asian ‘Gypsies’ Lyuli / Jughi / Multoni / Ghurbat / Ghorbat
Intermediate 
Communities
Tavoktarosh /
Kosatarosh / Sogutarosh
Mazang Agha /
Kashgar Lyuli
‘Gypsy-like’ Communities Chistoni Kavol Baluj Parya
The lyuli call themselves Mug’at, from an Arabic term meaning “fire cult followers” 
or “heathen” applied in the past to Zoroastrians; it has persisted despite the fact that 
they have been Sunni Muslims for centuries. They are subdivided by the geographical 
regions with which they are historically associated, e.g. samarkandikho, karshigikho, 
Mug’atoi bukhorgi, etc., and into patronymic clans (tupar) which are in turn comprised of 
separate extended families (avdol) (Nazarov, 1968a, pp. 43-45, 1975, pp. 3-23, 1983, pp. 
3-38; Abashin, 2004; Bessonov, 2008, pp. 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov, 2008).
Beyond the borders of the former USSR, small groups descended from Mug’at who 
migrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century from what was then Rus-
sian Turkestan are to be found in Afghanistan, where they are called ghorbat. They con-
tinue to use self-appellations such as kulobi, bukhori, samarkandi, etc. (Günther, 2007, 
pp. 103-120, 2011, pp. 86-98). The latter two obviously derive from Bukhara and Samar-
kand, suggesting that these regional names persist even after moving away.
6thE LYULI oF CEntral asia: baCkground data
The Mug’at, a hierarchically structured community most commonly known as lyuli by 
neighboring populations, have for centuries been an integral part of Central Asian life. 
They live primarily in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with smaller populations in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan (mainly in the Fergana Valley) as well as a small presence in Turkmeni-
stan. They inhabit both major urban centers such as Samarkand, Bukhara and Tashkent, 
and rural areas (Snesarev, 1960, pp. 24-29; Snesarev & Troitskaya, 1963, pp. 597-609; 
Nazarov, 1968a, pp. 43-45, 1975, pp. 3-23, 1980, pp. 165-185, 1983: pp. 3-38; Bessonov, 
2008, pp. 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov, 2008; Khakimov, 2010, pp. 32-53).
They are generally multilingual, commonly having a mastery of both Uzbek (even out-
side of Uzbekistan proper) and often also Russian, which retains a legal status of “lan-
guage of transnational communication” throughout most countries of Central Asia. All 
our communication with lyuli men, women and even children was conducted in Russian, 
and none of them had any significant difficulties operating in it. Their mother tongue, ho-
wever, is Tajik. They often also possess Tajik preferred identity, and especially outside of 
Tajikistan tend to publicly identify as Tajiks in addition to or in place of their own ethnic 
identity (Snesarev, 1960, pp. 24-29; Oransky, 1961, pp. 62-77, 1964a, pp. 62-75, 1964b, 
pp. 3-16; 1971a, pp. 66-99; 1977; 1983; Snesarev & Troitskaya, 1963, pp. 597-609; Khaki-
mov, 2010, pp. 54-60). 
Due both to the complex nature of their identity and because it is often perceived 
negatively by others, many lyuli self-declare their “nationality” (natsional’nost’ in Rus-
sian; term used in Soviet times and in use also in post-Soviet space for ethnic belonging 
and self-identification) as Tajik rather than tsygane (“Gypsies”) on census forms during 
the Soviet period. As a result, official data are not a reliable indicator of the true size of 
the population. Bearing this in mind, official figures are as follows:
• In 1926 3,710 persons in the Uzbek SSR (which then included today’s Tajikistan) declared 
themselves as tsygane; 
• In 1939 the figures were 5,487 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,193 in the Tajik SSR, 4,257 in the Ka-
zakh SSR, 644 in the Kyrgyz SSR and 190 in the Turkmen SSR;
• The 1959 figures were 7,860 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,556 in the Tajik SSR, 7,265 in the Kazakh 
SSR, 776 in the Kyrgyz SSR, and 103 in the Turkmen SSR; 
• In 1970 the number of self-declared tsygane was 11,371 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,171 in the 
Tajik SSR, 7,766 in the Kazakh SSR, 863 in the Kyrgyz SSR, and 218 in the Turkmen SSR;
• The 1979 figures for the Uzbek SSR were 12,581; in the Tajik SSR 1,139; in the Kazakh SSR 
8,626; in the Kyrgyz SSR 1,927, and in the Turkmen SSR 357 persons;
• In 1989 in the Uzbek SSR 16,397 persons declared themselves tsygane; in the Tajik SSR 
1,791 persons; in the Kazakh SSR 7,165 persons; in the Kyrgyz SSR 990 persons, and in the 
Turkmen SSR 119 persons (Perepisi naseleniia, 2012).
The Newly Independent States that have emerged in the region since the collapse of 
the USSR have not conducted censuses on a regular basis, so available data are incom-
plete, fragmented and in many cases approximate. So for example, according to expert 
estimates formulated in 2000 there were only about 5,000 tsygane (Roma and lyuli) in 
Uzbekistan; that same year, 4,300 individuals self-declared as tsygane in the census of 
the Republic of Tajikistan. (Tul’sky, 2005) To put these figures in context, there was sig-
nificant emigration, particularly of ethnic Russians and roma, from Central Asia during 
7this period. The comparison of data shows that some States (Uzbekistan in particular) 
experienced a dramatic decrease in the lyuli population, while others, like Tajikistan, ex-
perienced significant increases.
Both trends are associated with changes in public attitudes towards this population: 
the more negative and stigmatizing the public perception of tsygane or “Gypsies”, the 
more likely lyuli are to hide their identity. In any case, the actual number of lyuli currently 
living in the countries of Central Asia is significantly higher than the official figures, just as 
it was in previous historical periods.
The lyuli traditionally lived a nomadic or semi-nomadic life style, stopping for the win-
ter months in rented houses or agricultural outbuildings in the kishlaks (from the Turkic, 
a rural settlement in Central Asia). Men’s characteristic occupations included trading 
horses and donkeys, producing various objects from horsehair, making costume je-
welry, itinerant trading, providing cures for the ailments of humans and/or animals, se-
asonal agricultural labor, providing music for various family and village celebrations and 
woodworking. From producing different wooden utensils derive even some group’s self
-appellations, e.g. tavoktarosh from tavok (wooden dish), sogutarosh from sugu (woo-
den bowl), kosatarosh from kosa (wooden cup), koshuktarosh from koshuk (spoon), etc. 
(Khakimov, 2010, p. 39) Women helped their husbands in these activities but their main 
occupation was simply begging, combined in many cases with fortunetelling and other 
magical and folk-healing practices (Nazarov, 1975, pp. 3–23, 1980, pp. 165–185, 1982, 
pp. 3–28; Abashin, 2004; Bessonov, 2008, pp. 27–39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov, 2008; Kha-
kimov, 2010, pp. 69–78). 
After the October Revolution of 1917, the new Soviet government implemented po-
licies designed to transform the socio-economic situation of so-called tsygane sredne-
aziatskie (“Central Asian Gypsies”), the main objectives of which were forced settlement 
and inclusion in the State-run labor force (a policy pursued by other communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe as well). Because the lyuli were classed as tsygane sred-
neaziatskie (“Central Asian Gypsies”), i.e. a part of the tsygane minority, they were sub-
ject to all measures undertaken by the Soviet State with regard to tsygane. In the 1920s 
a number of tsyganskie kolkhozy (“Gypsy collective farms”) and tsyganskie arteli (“Gyp-
sy cooperatives”) were set up throughout the Soviet Union. tsyganskie kolkhozy in Cen-
tral Asia engaged mainly in the cultivation of cotton (by 1937 there were thirteen such in 
Uzbekistan alone) while the region’s tsyganskie arteli were mainly involved in the collec-
tion of scrap metal and other secondary raw materials, wood processing, basket making, 
etc. tsyganskie shkoly (“Gypsy schools”) and, in the case of Central Asia, separate tsy-
ganskie klassy (“Gypsy classes”) were established as well. 
In 1938, however, State policy towards nationalities, including tsygane, underwent ra-
dical reform, shifting from the “special policy” of supporting ethnic development towards 
what would today be termed “mainstreaming”: “Gypsy” schools and classes were clo-
sed and the pupils moved into mainstream education; “Gypsy”-specific collective farms 
and cooperatives were dissolved, and those engaged in them redirected towards existing 
collective farms in rural areas and towards factories and enterprises in the towns (Na-
zarov, pp. 1968c: 67-73, 1969b, pp. 73-77, 1970; Bessonov, 2008, pp. 27-39; Gabbasov 
& Cherenkov 2008).
On the fifth of October 1956 this policy was given increased impetus by Decree No. 
1373 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the admission to labor 
of the gypsy vagrants, followed by Ordinance No. 685 of the Council of Ministers of 
8the USSR on the twentieth of October the same year. The latter prohibited the nomadic 
way of life and criminalized those who would try to avoid sedentarization, simultaneously 
obliging local authorities to assist those affected by offering them housing, employment 
and schooling. (Polnoe sobranie zakonodatel’stva SSSR, n.d.) As a result, tsygane (inclu-
ding lyuli) gradually adopted an almost entirely sedentary lifestyle and became an integral 
part of the social structures of Soviet society, though generally at its periphery. Nominal-
ly they became part of the ‘new historical, social and international unity of people’, the 
‘Soviet people’. Soviet people as political concept was adopted at 70s of 20th century 
and was determined as: “A new historical, social, and international community of people 
having a common territory, economy, and socialist content; a culture that reflected the 
particularities of multiple nationalities; a federal state; and a common ultimate goal: the 
construction of communism (Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Ėntsiklopediia, 1970-1978). In terms 
of marxist-leninist class ideology the lyuli were part of the ruling class, as the so-called 
“agricultural proletariat”. Some individuals went on to higher education, including univers-
ity degrees, and achieved decent social positions. The most famous representative of 
this new lyuli elite was Professor Khol Nazarov (Demeter, Bessonov, & Kutenkov, 2000, 
pp. 240–242; Marushiakova & Popov, 2003, pp. 293–294, 2008).
Following the 1991 breakup of the USSR and the establishment of independent States 
in Central Asia, the relatively high degree of social integration enjoyed by the lyuli during 
the Soviet era proved unstable and superficial. In the ensuing conditions of severe econo-
mic crisis and exacerbated social relations, the majority of lyuli lost their jobs and were 
left with literally no means of subsistence. The ensuing social climate exacerbated ethnic 
tensions, reviving and intensifying negative attitudes formulated over the centuries, trans-
formed them to declassed community (phenomena also experienced by the Roma popu-
lations in the former communist block of Central and Eastern Europe). Simultaneously, as 
newly independent Central Asian countries have engaged in intensive “nation building,” 
the lyuli find themselves pushed from the so-called “titular nation” (titul’naya natsia – 
a Russian term used in the region to designate a given country’s dominant population) 
and in most countries of the region are once again being perceived as “aliens”.
A bad economic situation, armed conflicts, negative attitudes towards them and wor-
sening interethnic relations are, in combination with the generally low level of education 
among the lyuli, the main factors behind the rapid deterioration in their overall circum-
stances. The situation continues unabated and, to date, there have been no significant 
efforts to improve it, whether through domestic mechanisms or foreign aid. The lyuli 
have not been included in any of the national or international action and support programs 
directed towards Europe’s Roma and Sinti, nor has their case been espoused by any so-
cial movement or NGO. The only exception we come across is the “Community Founda-
tion of Central Asian Gypsies in the Osh region ‘Luli’“, established by non-Lyuli in 2002 in 
Kyrgyzstan. The Foundation however failed to implement any projects.
LYULI in thE russian FEdEration
lyuli migration (especially from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) increased significantly in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. Most of the region’s Newly Independent States 
have, since their emergence, been in severe social and economic crisis, which became 
9a major push factor for the first lyuli migration. The breakdown of public and municipal 
services and the collapse of many enterprises, particularly collective farms, coupled with 
deteriorating public attitudes towards them, left a huge proportion of lyuli permanently 
unemployed with no means of subsistence and no prospect of regular work. As an ad-
ditional “push” factor, from 1992-1997 Tajikistan was in a state of outright civil war. 
Changes in the legislation of the Russian Federation facilitated migration. In 1991 
Chapter 209 of the Criminal Code, under which so-called tuneyadstvo (social parasitism 
or the maintenance of a parasitic lifestyle – in a word, begging) was subject to prosecu-
tion, was repealed. The above mentioned chapter was inherited from the time of the 
USSR and reflected Soviet thinking, in which unemployment was ideologically unaccep-
table and incompatible with a “socialist way of life”. It was therefore officially eliminated 
and those who were not engaged in either work or study were subject to prosecution. 
Begging, considered a form of “social parasitism”, was a criminal offense. Repeal of this 
chapter was indication of a significant change in policies of Russian Federation, which 
influences change in living strategies of lyuli.
Large scale lyuli migration directed towards the Russian Federation and other inde-
pendent countries forming on the ruins of the former USSR began in the early 1990s and 
continues to the present day. It remains a major source of their livelihood. lyuli migrate 
as whole families, men, women and children, including infants. The women’s main oc-
cupation is begging (usually with small children) on the streets of big cities (particularly 
Moscow and St. Petersburg), a highly visible activity that attracts negative attention from 
Russian society and media. The lyuli travel mainly by train. Their principal point of entry 
into the Russian Federation is the town of Astrakhan due to its direct rail connections 
with Uzbekistan (Bukhara and Samarkand) and Tajikistan (Dushanbe), and also because, 
as most of our Moscow-based informants emphasized, “the people there are better to-
wards us”. Their second major entry point is Novosibirsk, with rail links to the Fergana 
Valley and Tashkent regions of Uzbekistan. Other entrance points are cities such as Sa-
ratov, Samara, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg and Omsk: the rail network enables lyuli to 
move not only to the European part of the Russian Federation but to Siberia and the Far 
East as well. 
lyuli migration is impressive in both scale and scope. Although primarily directed to-
wards the largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, lyuli are to be found on the streets 
of almost all of the Russian Federation’s major urban centers, including Arkhangelsk and 
Murmansk on the shores of the Arctic Ocean in the extreme northwest and Vladivostok 
on the Pacific coast in the Far East. Generally they prefer larger and more developed 
economic centers, but have also made their way to more remote and less developed 
regions. Thus, for example, the first lyuli appeared in Syktikvar (in the Komi Republic) 
as early as in 1993; their arrivals and departures, and the legality of their remaining, are 
still periodically reported and discussed in local media. (“Vremia liuli: Tadzhikskie tsygane 
izvlekaiut pol’zu iz nesovershenstva rossiĭskikh zakonov”, 2003) In 2002 some 315 Uzbek 
lyuli were expelled from Surgut in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region in western Siberia. 
(“Surgut “zachistili” ot uzbekskikh tsygan”, 2002) In 2008 the local authorities and resi-
dents of Yuzhno Sakhalinsk (on Sakhalin Island, just north of Japan) held public discus-
sions (“Na Sakhalin na zarobotki vpervye pribyla gruppa tsygan iz blizhnego zarubezh’ia”, 
n.d.; “Muzhchiny iz tsyganskogo tabora pytaiutsia naĭti rabotu v Yuzhno-Sakhalinske”, 
2008) to consider the still unresolved issue of how to expel Central Asian lyuli (“K nam 
priekhal tabor”, 2010). 
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The lyuli quest for new economic spaces went beyond the boundaries of the Russian 
Federation. In the 1990s they were relatively common on the streets of the major cities 
of the Ukraine. In Belarus they began to arrive in significant numbers in the early 1990s; 
by 1997 they had established a major camp on the outskirts of Minsk, and they were 
eventually deported by arrangement with the Embassy of Tajikistan. (“Neprikayannye”, 
1997)
Tightening border controls have curtailed and gradually redirected lyuli migration, 
which is now by and large confined to the States of Central Asia and the Russian Fede-
ration. In recent years Kazakhstan has attracted more and more migrant workers, among 
them lyuli, from neighboring countries, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. lyuli mi-
grants in Kazakhstan typically combine begging with seasonal agricultural labor, those 
from Uzbekistan are mainly involved in the harvesting of cotton while lyuli from Kyrgy-
zstan generally work with tobacco. 
In their migrations lyuli have for years used their old Soviet passports for entering the 
Russian Federation, and the adoption of the Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian 
Federation in 2002 did not change the situation. As citizens of their countries of origin 
(primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) which are part of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, lyuli are entitled to visa-free entry to the Russian Federation and to remain there 
for a period of up to three months. They are, however, required to register domicile wit-
hin three days of arriving in the country. Few do so, preferring to set up temporary camps 
or shantytowns on the outskirts of population centers. 
lyuli in the Russian Federation face both old and new problems and difficulties arising 
from their migrant status. The most common of these has always been the threat of de-
portation on grounds of failure to register or overstaying the three-month deadline. It sho-
uld be noted that although. These legal requirements are violated by the majority of mi-
grant workers deportations are rare, except in the case of lyuli – a real possibility if they 
fail to pay the blackmail often demanded by the police. They also have frequent dealings 
with inspectors from the migration services. Eviction and/or deportation may be carried 
out on grounds of lack of proper residence or work permits, illegal accommodation, su-
spicion of spreading infectious disease, complaints from citizens, public nuisance (usually 
a euphemism for begging, especially with small children) etc. Local mafia types, attracted 
by myths of hereditary gold and high earnings from begging and supposed drug dealing, 
are yet another threat. In the same time we also heard stories from colleagues working 
with lyuli communities in Russia about mafia members who went to lyuli camps with 
the intention of extorting money from them but, shocked by their extreme poverty, gave 
them small donations instead.
 In April 2012 employees of the Federal Migration Service in the Novosibirsk area disco-
vered an illegal tent settlement in the forest not far from the city of Berdsk. It was home 
to lyuli from Uzbekistan who worked the city’s litter bins and dumps, collecting cans, pla-
stic bags, bottles, etc. which they sold on to scrap merchants, earning on average 100-150 
rubles (between €2.50 and €4) per family per day. Law enforcement agents detained thirty 
citizens of Uzbekistan. First offenders without migrant registration were fined, while re-
peat violators were deported by court order (“V Berdske obnaruzhili lyuli”, 2012). 
In July 2012, in the same region, people with holiday homes in the countryside near 
Novosibirsk notified local agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Fede-
ration and of the Office of the Federal Migration Service about the existence of an illegal 
tent settlement. Forty-six Uzbek lyuli were found to be living there. They had arrived 
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the previous month and their main occupation was collecting scrap metal from landfills 
(“Nelegal’nyĭ tsyganskiĭ tabor byl obnaruzhen pod Novosibirskom”, 2012). Fourteen of 
them were found to be in the territory of the Russian Federation in violation of legal requi-
rements, and were deported. 
Some of our lyuli informants claim that such actions are often more a case of forcing 
people out of a given region than of bona fide deportation. One such case occurred in the 
Siberian city of Tyumen in 2010. lyuli living there were found to be carrying a number of 
infectious diseases such as scarlet fever and polio. The local authorities gathered them, 
gave them two train carloads to load their belongings, and drove them outside the bor-
ders of the Tyumen administrative region.
In other cases, lyuli have learned to exploit the authorities’ willingness to get rid of 
them. For example in April 2012, in the Chelyabinsk region, ten lyuli adults, including 
a mother with five children, voluntarily presented themselves at the local bailiff’s office, 
from which they were taken directly to Balandino airport and repatriated. They had been 
living in a tabor (temporary camp) on the outskirts of Chelyabinsk, between the Meri-
dian Highway and the railroad tracks. Their incomes, mostly from begging on the streets, 
were low, so they chose to return home at public expense. After a few months back in 
Tajikistan, one of the families headed back to Russia, this time to Moscow.
Years of constant migration have enabled the lyuli to gather significant amounts of 
practical information about conditions in different regions of Russia, which in turn allows 
them to plan and direct their migrations. For example, during major Orthodox holidays, 
when believers are inclined to give alms, they head to the most visited churches and mo-
nasteries, while during Muslim holidays they turn to regions with a predominantly Muslim 
population. In Dagestan, for example, the lyuli are mostly known as “Tajiks”, i.e. they are 
not generally regarded as “Gypsies”. They arrive annually in the capital Makhachkala aro-
und the time of the Bayram festival and can be found begging at all road intersections. Ty-
pically, they rent cheap houses in the suburbs, with large numbers of people sharing dwel-
lings, for the duration of their stay. When the holidays are over, they leave the country. 
In some places a gradual transition from illegal camps and temporary shantytowns to 
permanent residence in the towns has been made. In downtown Kazan, for example, 
a whole Central Asian quarter has taken shape since the 1990s. Its old, sometimes for-
merly abandoned, houses are mostly inhabited by lyuli, who make a living by begging 
in the major markets and sometimes selling dried fruit (“Ėkspert: V tsentre Kazani liuli 
zakhvatili tselyĭ kvartal”, 2012). 
lyuli migrants have relatively limited possibilities for economic activity. In the early 
1990s, when large scale lyuli migration was a new phenomenon, they usually traveled to 
the Russian Federation in spring and stayed there until returning to their homelands for 
the autumn harvests. From very early on, however, some were already overwintering ab-
road, in camps (e.g. in the forests near Moscow) or abandoned buildings, surviving mainly 
by begging. In the early years, these families relied almost exclusively on the earnings 
of women and children, whose main occupation is begging on the streets of big cities 
and in front of churches and/or mosques. It is only within the past four to five years that 
men have also become significant contributors to the family economy. Typically, they are 
employed (sometimes legally, but more often illegally) in temporary construction jobs or 
other unskilled labor, or involved in collecting scrap and other secondary raw materials. 
In recent years more and more lyuli (especially men) are seeking to regularize both 
their residential and their employment status. In some rare cases lyuli women – for 
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example those working at fruit and vegetable warehouses near Moscow – have also fo-
und employment in the mainstream economy. The general trend is towards long-term 
stays in the Russian Federation, with an accompanying increase in efforts towards lega-
lizing residence and employment, and some even seeking Russian citizenship. Naturally, 
the longer lyuli have been in Russia, the more experience they gain, and the easier it be-
comes for them. They cease to dress in ways that distinguish them from the surrounding 
population, declare themselves to be Tajiks, and find legal or semi-legal low-skill jobs in 
construction, scrap collection, sanitation, trade and communal services, and so on.
Although they are to be found throughout the vast territories of the Russian Federa-
tion, Moscow remains the preferred destination for lyuli migrants (especially from Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan) as well as for other migrants from Central Asia. They live in camps, 
rented buildings, abandoned houses, barns and sheds as well as basements and residen-
tial buildings, a dozen people together, and even on building sites (so they don’t need to 
travel to work). They are mainly employed in construction and as janitors (the preferred 
job, as it includes accommodation). During our field research in Moscow in the autumn 
of 2012, the only lyuli remaining in the city were those with jobs in construction or as 
janitors, while those who lived in camps had journeyed back to their homelands because 
of cold weather. 
Throughout the Russian Federation, all schools are required to accept the children of 
migrants whether they are legal or not, but in practice only a limited number of schools 
in Moscow do so. However not one of the lyuli we interviewed in Moscow had enrolled 
their children in school there. A significant obstacle to lyuli children’s school enrolment 
is the practice of giving birth outside hospital, as a result of which they have no birth cer-
tificate or other ID. In 2006 the St. Petersburg Center for the Prevention of Child Neglect 
and Drug Addiction investigating an illegal lyuli camp near the city discovered fifty chil-
dren without any personal documents (ADTs Memorial, 2010, p. 43).
The narratives of our lyuli informants in Moscow and nearby satellite towns focused 
primarily on issues of migration and their life in the Russian capital. Most had accumula-
ted relatively long experience of this type of labor migration, and many recalled the 1990s 
when they first set up camps in local woodlands. The following story told us by two lyuli 
women from Tajikistan, in Moscow in autumn 2012 describes the situation:
We would choose a camping place that couldn’t easily be seen, but was relatively close to 
an elektrichka [electric train] station so we could get in to Moscow. We made tents, kept the 
camp clean, and we had an aksakal with us for solving problems. But it was a hard time – the 
women and children went begging every day and sometimes people came and collected mo-
ney in return for letting us stay there. Some people still live like that, but now we have shelter 
and work, and we’re earning more money, so life is much better. As for how it will be in futu-
re ... who knows? 
Most of the lyuli we interviewed indicated gradual but steady improvement in their 
situation. Ten to fifteen years ago camp dwellers lived under double pressure from both 
criminal elements and the police, both of which had to be bribed, and under constant th-
reat of deportation or expulsion from the Moscow region. Their main income came from 
the not particularly profitable occupation of begging, carried out by women and children. 
Work for men (usually illegal, in construction) was hard to find. 
In the last five to ten years the Russian State, and particularly the greater Moscow re-
gion, has experienced rapid economic growth and achieved greater stability. These deve-
lopments have dramatically transformed the lives of lyuli migrants. Our informants highlig-
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hted this in every conversation, emphasizing positive changes on the first place in relation 
to accommodation – from forest camps to urban or village conditions. So one lyuli man 
from Tajikistan told us in Moscow in autumn 2011: “Don’t believe in the romance of the 
nomadic life. Of course it is much better to live in house than a tent in the forest!” The 
positive changes are seen also in the nature of basic work activities within their large fami-
lies, from subsistence on the begging of women and children the move is toward more or 
less regular employment for men as janitors, drivers, or construction workers. 
Increased income, improved living conditions and partial legalization have made po-
ssible the gradual formation of stable networks among lyuli migrants based on kinship/
clan and region of origin. These are intertwined with, but separate from, the general 
networks of migrant workers from Central Asia, and community life takes place largely 
within these frameworks. There is no trend towards a return to their homelands, at le-
ast among those we interviewed, who almost unanimously expressed the opinion that 
“Things are not getting better at home, and there is no hope that this will change soon”.
Attitudes within Russian society towards lyuli migrants are ambivalent. In the early 
years of their migrations, lyuli were not clearly identifiable as such. The media usually re-
ferred to them as Tajiks or as Roma (local European “Gypsies”). In this context they were 
often accused of drug trafficking and other criminal activities popularly associated with 
these groups. As a result they became victims of cruel racist and nationalistic attacks, in-
cluding the burning out of some temporary camps, e.g. in the woods near the St. Peters-
burg suburb of Gorelovo in 2009 (Shkurenok, 2009). In human rights circles the pogrom 
of a lyuli camp near St. Petersburg in 2003, in which skinheads killed six-year-old Nilufar 
Sangoeva, was a particularly well known case (ADTs Memorial, 2005, pp. 132–133). After 
lengthy court proceedings the perpetrators received heavy penalties.
Over the last few years the public visibility of Central Asian lyuli in Moscow has dec-
reased somewhat, with less women and children begging on the streets and in front of 
churches. Begging continues, but has shifted both in where it is done and when. Nowa-
days it is concentrated in monasteries and mosques on religious holidays and in markets 
(especially food markets). It is accompanied with magical services. Early in the morning 
lyuli women burn incense on the market stalls of their compatriots from Central Asia, 
using special herbs (called isryk or adraspan) which according to Central Asian beliefs ser-
ve as ritual purification, dispel evil forces and attract luck and prosperity.
Over the course of time Muscovites have become more and more aware of “Tajiks” 
(the term used nowadays to describe all migrant workers from Central Asia, regardless 
of ethnic background and country of origin). Ethnic tensions are steadily growing and fear 
of criminal activities by “persons of Caucasian nationality” is gradually being replaced by 
fear of a mass invasion by “Tajiks” who “have already occupied Moscow”, which “no 
longer looks like a Russian city.” 
The exact number of migrants from Central Asia, be it in Moscow in particular or the 
Russian Federation as a whole, is extremely difficult to determine. Lack of precision aro-
und the concepts of legal or illegal “migrant workers” is compounded by their constant 
movement between Russia and their homelands. According some local scholars, illegal 
migrants outnumber legal ones by a ratio of approximately 7:1. 
The Russian State is trying to control migration, although it lacks experience in so do-
ing because so much of what was “internal migration” two decades ago is today “trans-
national migration”. Migration within Russia is monitored and regulated by the Federal 
Migration Service, created in 2004 by Decree No. 314 (point 13) of the President of the 
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Russian Federation, on the system and structure of Federal bodies of Executive Power. 
The FMS is a federal executive body responsible for implementing State policy in rela-
tion to migration, including law enforcement, control, supervision, and the provision of 
public services. It is currently subordinated to the Government of the Russian Federation 
(Decree of the President of Russia, May 21, 2012, No. 636). On the first of January 2006 
the FMS set up regional branches bringing together passport and visa services and the 
migration-related subdivisions at the Ministry of the Interior. 
One way for migrants from Central Asia to regularize their legal status is by obtaining 
a so-called “migrant’s patent,” introduced in 2010. This is a special document confirming 
the right of foreign nationals who do not require a visa to enter Russia, to remain in the 
country as employees of a private individual. In this way migrants are legalized in terms 
of work and taxes, but not in terms of a residence permit. The procedure for obtaining 
a patent is very simple. They are issued out of the annual quotas for work permits, and 
are available only to so-called extended visa-free foreigners (i.e., citizens of post-Soviet 
space). To qualify, the individual must specify the purpose of their travel as employment 
when filling in migration forms on arrival in Russia. A patent may be extended for a total 
period of not more than twelve months, after which the individual is expected to leave 
Russia. In practice, this sometimes means crossing the border and returning after a co-
uple of minutes. It is also theoretically possible, but much more difficult, to obtain a new 
patent without leaving the country. 
Recently the legislative norms of the Russian Federation in regard of the labour migra-
tions undergo a number of changes. The last ammendment regulating the conditions of 
migrant workers and incorporating changes in the law is adopted at the end of 2014 with 
Federal Act on the legal status of Foreign Citizens in the russian Federation (Federal’nyĭ 
zakon, 2014). An important aspect of these new legislative norms is the official legali-
zation of long-standing practice, as the decree allows employers to take on foreigners 
temporarily residing in Russia without a work permit. President Vladimir Putin has signed 
also a law on mandatory of the “migrant’s patent” and of Russian language exams for mi-
grants. The system for notifying the Federal Migration Service about foreign employees 
has also been streamlined, and can now be done electronically. President Putin has also 
approved changes in existing laws, ensuring migrants’ social security and establishing 
administrative responsibility with regard to their material, health and housing status. This 
new legislation also tightens responsibility for regularizing illegal migrants. 
The general trend in policy towards migrant workers (who mostly originate in the Cen-
tral Asian countries, and whose labor is needed by the Russian economy) is that migra-
tion be promoted, legalized, regulated and controlled. Of particular interest in the region 
is the official public announcement made by President Putin in December 2012, in which 
he clearly stated that from 2015 citizens of the Newly Independent States will be requi-
red to show international passports (instead of national ID cards, as has been the case 
since the breakup of the USSR) to cross into the Russian Federation. In compliance with 
this requirement on 17th June 2014 Decree No. 555 of the Government of the Russian 
Federation (Postanovlenie, 2014) was adopted and now the citizens of Tajikistan are allo-
wed to enter Russia only with international passports. According to the internal legislation 
of Uzbekistan any travel of the Uzbek citizens is permitted only for passports holders, 
thus in practice this requirement also applies to them. As for Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 
who are members of the Eurasian Customs Union, their citizens do not need international 
passports for entering Russian Federation. 
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The Russian authorities are making efforts to improve Central Asian migrant workers’ 
conditions for adaptation and integration. Some pilot schemes offering practical courses 
such as Russian language, introduction to labor law in the Russian Federation, the availa-
bility of job opportunities etc. to potential migrants have been set up. They are funded by 
the “Russian World” foundation, which enjoys special government support and is used 
to implement various State policies. Some lyuli living in Tajikistan have heard about the-
se opportunities, and that there are migrants who have obtained employment in Moscow 
and other Russian cities thanks to special bilateral agreements, but do not benefit from 
them because they believe that, as tsygane, these options do not apply to them.
Yet virtually only few lyuli take advantage of this relatively liberal system. In most 
cases they do not have the minimum necessary knowledge or social literacy skills to 
do so. In practice migrant lyuli continue to rely primarily on established community and 
regional networks for assistance in employment, housing, obtaining medical services, 
and – rarely – the education of their children. When talking about such networks infor-
mants usually use expressions like “our friends help us,” “we have our people,” “I get 
advice from my neighbor,” etc.
The main problems of migrant workers from Central Asia in general, and local lyuli in 
particular, are associated not so much with the opportunities for labor migration in Rus-
sia, but with the situation in their home countries (especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan). Most migrate in order to survive and to support their relatives at home. Tho-
se who are able to save some money use it to buy (secondhand) cars, repair their homes, 
or, in some cases, even to build new ones. The difficult economic situation and lack of 
prospects in Central Asia dooms them to heavy reliance on income earned abroad, i.e. 
they are bound to migrate to find work, and there are no indications of significant change 
in this situation, at least for the foreseeable future. 
lyuli, like many people in Central Asia, migrate to escape severe social and economic 
conditions, and in this sense are part of the region’s general migration trends. lyuli from 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan migrate mainly to Russia, but Kazakhstan has recently become 
a more popular destination, with small numbers even migrating to Kyrgyzstan. 
lyuli face, to some extent, the same problems as other migrants, due to gaps in or 
even contradictions between local laws concerning migrant workers, and how these are 
actually implemented by the authorities (e.g. the widespread practice of blackmail by po-
lice and migration officers) (Marushiakova & Popov, 2011). In addition, however, lyuli ex-
perience particular difficulties in integrating into the labor market and social realities of 
their host countries due to generally low levels of education and poor social literacy co-
upled with the social stigma associated with their ascribed identity as tsygane. All these 
factors contribute to their dependence on informal (often illegal) networks, involvement 
in begging and other marginal activities, living in unregulated or illegal settlements, and 
facing increasing hostility and rejection. 
Migrant workers from Central Asia are generally labeled “Tajiks,” and lyuli often de-
fine themselves as such. The public image of “Tajiks” is deteriorating, and transborder 
migration is currently one of the most hotly debated issues in the Russian media. lyuli 
are also often subject to negative attitudes and stereotypes towards Roma, such as the 
assumption that they are all involved in drug dealing, or have strong hypnotic powers 
which they misuse to steal from the majority.
On a positive note, migrant lyuli in the Russian Federation (and recently also in Ka-
zakhstan) are taking steps towards stabilization, as illustrated by their efforts to gradually 
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legalize their status. Such attempts may, however, be periodically hindered by fluctua-
tions in relations between their countries of origin and of residence. The most dramatic 
instance of this phenomenon, repeatedly mentioned by our informants in Tajikistan and 
the subject of blanket media coverage at the time, occurred in autumn 2011 when two 
Russian pilots found guilty of smuggling were given lengthy prison sentences by a Tajik 
court, and Russia retaliated by expelling large numbers of migrants. 
lyuli’s idEntity nowadays
lyuli migration in the Russian Federation has revealed new dimensions of their identity. 
As with the Roma worldwide, the identity of lyuli is multidimensional, hierarchically stru-
ctured, and – crucially – always contextual, i.e. depending on the social environment, dif-
ferent aspects of identity emerge. In the conditions of Central Asia, the situation is clear 
and simple: lyuli are a separate community with their own identity, clearly distinguished 
from the surrounding population, but sharing a regional consciousness and identification 
as citizens. On a broader level their Tajik mother tongue determines their preferred Tajik 
identity in Central Asian countries outside Tajikistan, as well as in Russia. 
Developments in preferred ethnic identity for lyuli outside the Central Asian region 
can be confirmed by data from censuses of the Russian Federation (which take into acco-
unt only those who have acquired Russian citizenship). The 2002 census was the first to 
include, alongside the existing tsygane (“Gypsies”) heading, the separate category of 
tsygane sredneaziatskie (“Central Asian Gypsies”), with other designations (gurbath, ju-
ghi, lyuli, Mug’at, Multon, and tavoktarosh) included as clarification. Significantly, while 
the 2002 census recorded 486 persons identifying themselves as “Central Asian Gyp-
sies”, the next, in 2010, recorded only forty-nine of them (Vserossiĭskaia perepis’ nase-
leniia 2002 goda, n.d.; Vserossiĭskaia perepis’ naseleniia 2010 goda, n.d.). It seems highly 
unlikely that in the period between the two censuses several hundred “Central Asian 
Gypsies” who had succeeded in obtaining Russian citizenship (no easy procedure) deci-
ded to leave Russia. Much higher is the probability that they declared another identity in 
the second census.
In the course of their migrations within the Russian Federation, lyuli come into incre-
ased contact with European Roma and with local preconceptions concerning them. They 
are therefore compelled to seek ways of differentiating themselves from these other tsy-
gane. When the researchers asked lyuli in Moscow about their ethnicity, they all insisted 
at first that they were Tajik (regardless of country of origin). Only in response to repeated 
requests for clarification did they say, “We are Mug’at,” in conjunction with which many 
emphasized repeatedly “Mug’at, that’s a kind of Tajik,” i.e. they tried to present Mug’at 
as an internal division of Tajiks. When asked if they could be considered tsygane, the 
answer was “We are not like them.” The lyuli label was rejected too, out of fear that it 
could be seen as coming under the tsygane or “Gypsies” heading. Yet at home in Cen-
tral Asia, where they are not being compared with tsygane in the Russian Federation, 
they describe themselves as tsygane when speaking Russian. Only in some places in 
Central Asia, in rare cases of outright conflict with European tsygane, do lyuli refuse to 
apply the Russian term to themselves. As for the appellation “Roma”, which has in re-
cent decades been adopted throughout Europe as the politically correct umbrella term for 
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various communities, it is generally completely unknown, and incomprehensible, to lyuli. 
The dividing line between Lyuli and Roma is kept also because the mutual rejection. At-
titudes of local Roma in Russia towards migrating lyuli are generally negative, and they 
strongly distinguish themselves from them, as well as from Hungarian-speaking Madyari 
(from Transcarpathia). To the Roma way of thinking, lyuli cannot be considered to be 
nastoyashchie tsygane (“real Gypsies”) partly because they are poor and live by begging 
and, even more crucially, do not speak Romanes and are Muslims. 
International institutions and NGOs (mostly those acting in the field of human rights), 
by contrast, in past have not generally distinguished between lyuli and Roma. In recent 
years there is some recognition that these are different kinds of communities (European 
Roma Right Centre, 2005; ADTs Memorial, 2010), but still some authors continue to con-
sider Lyuli to be inseparable part of the Gypsies, equating this term with notion of Roma 
(Bessonov, 2000, 2003; Günter, 2007, 2011), however these factors are insufficient to 
influence significant changes in the identity of lyuli.
ConClusions 
The lyuli and other similar Central Asian groups continue to face social exclusion and 
discrimination, and in this their experience is similar to that of European roma: their sta-
tus and position have deteriorated since independence. In the USSR they were just one, 
very small entity among hundreds of different “nationalities” in a multinational State and 
were able to profit from mainstream policies implemented. In the newly independent 
nation-states they have become more visible, and more easily singled out. Deteriorating 
provision in health and education, high unemployment, corruption, administrative arbitra-
riness, lack of social security, etc., endemic in most of the region’s countries, impact 
with particular severity on local “Gypsies.” Under these circumstances manifestations of 
intolerance and discrimination against lyuli and other similar groups encounter no serious 
resistance from the relevant institutions of new and fragile nation-states. 
The condition of Central Asian lyuli in the individual countries of their home region 
displays common social and economic problems, but different levels of social disengage-
ment of their communities from their respective ethnic majorities. In Kyrgyzstan, they are 
perceived as alien, not belonging to the “land of the Kyrgyz,” whereas in Tajikistan they 
are considered to be part of the country landscape, thus also part of the Tajik nation. The 
difficult social and economic situation of lyuli in their countries of origin, and the absence 
of prospects for development at home, compels them to rely primarily on income ear-
ned abroad. Thus they are doomed to be migrant workers, and there are no indications 
of significant improvement for the foreseeable future. On the contrary, all available data 
show a trend of increasing migration combined with continuing integration difficulties in 
host countries, where their needs and rights are ignored or neglected by the relevant in-
stitutions. Nowadays the problems of the so-called Central Asian ‘Gypsies’, including the 
lyuli, can not (and should not) be considered only in the context of particular countries in 
Central Asia whose citizens they are. It is more revealing to analyze them in the context 
of current realities in post-Soviet space as a whole, both the Russian Federation and the 
Newly Independent States, which remain linked to it in myriad ways. In spite of globali-
zation of processes of identity formation and nation building among Roma in Europe and 
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continuation of linking lyuli with Roma however we can not expect to see former leaving 
the post-soviet context and entering common policy space with European Roma.
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